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Abstract 
There has been constant friction between the U.S. and Japan on economic issues. After 
lengthy negotiations and threats of reprisal, Japan agreed to sell its Government Bonds through 
auctions that were open to foreign competition. This paper examines the U.S. experience in the 
Japanese Government Bond (JGB) auctions. It also empirically tests the predictions of auction 
theory with JGB auction data. While the winning share of U.S. firms in 10-year JGB auction 
market went through ups and downs, their share in the 20-year market has increased steadily. 
We find that the winning shares by the U.S. firms are positively related to auction profits, 
whereas the Japanese "Big Four" winning shares show negative association. We offer some 
possible explanations for this phenomenon. Furthermore, the average profits to winning bids in 
JGB auctions is not reliably different from zero, and the degree of competition and the level of 
uncertainty are found to be insignificant in determining auction profits. 
1. Introduction 
There has been constant friction between the U.S. and Japan on economic issues. One of 
the most contentious issues in the 1980s was the virtual exclusion of foreign firms from 
participation in the primary market for Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs). The JGB market is 
the second largest treasury bond market, with an outstanding volume of $2 trillion (more than 
two-thirds of the U.S. Treasury) and annual trading volume of $12 trillion in 1993.2 The efforts 
to open up the primary market for JGB to foreign competition was not easy due to several legal 
and political obstacles. The negotiations were conducted at the government level, mostly 
between Japan and the U.S. and the U.K. They often involved threats of retaliation in the form 
of denying license for Japanese financial institutions in the U.S. and U.K. markets. A major 
stepping stone was laid when an inter-governmental working group known as the U.S.-Japan 
Yen-Dollar Committee issued its report in May 1984. One of the major mandates addressed in 
the report was the liberalization of access of foreign financial institutions to Japanese financial 
markets. Several changes followed this report, including the extension membership and seats on 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and the introduction of the auction mechanism to the primary market 
of the JGBs. 
Before 1989, the JGBs were sold to investors through a syndicate of underwriters. In 
syndicated offerings, a designated syndicate of underwriters buys newly issued bonds from the 
Ministry of Finance at a negotiated price and distributes these bonds to retail investors. The 
syndicate consisted of more than 800 banks, securities firms, and insurance companies, with only 
2Bond Underwriters Association of Japan (1994). 
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small shares sold to foreign financial institutions.3 At a follow-up meeting of the U.S.-Japan 
Yen-Dollar Committee in April 1988, David Mulford, Assistant Treasury Secretary claimed that 
this underwriting mechanism is protectionist and treats U.S. financial institutions unfairly.4 The 
U.S. indicated that the Congress may include retaliatory provisions in the Omnibus Trade Act, 
which enables U.S. authorities to revoke primary dealership in the U.S. Treasury market which 
had already been given to three major Japanese financial institutions. In response to the U.S. 
demand, the Ministry of Finance first increased the overall share of foreign firms in the syndicate 
from 2.5% to 8% in 1988, and eventually decided to issue portions of the 10-year JGBs through 
an auction process, similar to that used for the U.S. Treasury auction. Under the new system, 
from April 1989 to September 1990, 40% of the new 10-year JGBs were issued through 
competitive discriminatory price auction and the remaining 60% were sold non-competitively to 
the syndicate members, at the quantity-weighted average of successful bids. From October 1990, 
again in response to continuing U.S. pressure, the auction portion was increased to 60%. The 
hybrid nature of combining auction and non-competitive allocation was a compromise between 
the U.S. position that the entire underwriting process should be based on an auction system and 
the Ministry's position that the syndicate underwriting system offers it a more stable conduit for 
distributing JGB issues.5 
This paper examines the extent to which the U.S. firms were able to penetrate the 
3For example, in 1985, the foreign share in the syndicate totaled only less than 1%. 
AJapan Economic Journal, April 30, 1988. 
5SeeSemkow(1992). 
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Japanese market subsequent to the opening of this market. The performance of the U.S. firms 
will shed some light on the usefulness of the aggressive U.S. posture in commerce negotiations 
with Japan. The next issue we examine is whether there are any discernible differences in the 
bidding skills of the U.S. firms relative to their Japanese counterparts. One of the reasons why 
the Japanese government was reluctant to open up the JGB primary market was that it was 
concerned that the U.S. firms, which dominate the U.S. Treasury auction market may have 
superior skills in the auction market and hence may grow to eventually take away a large share of 
the JGB market from the domestic firms. We directly evaluate this concern. 
Finally, we empirically test the predictions of auction theory with JGB auction data. 
There is a growing literature that tests the auction theory in the context of U.S. Treasury 
auctions. For example, Cammack (1991) investigates the T-bill auction in the U.S. and finds 
support for the theory. On the other hand, Jegadeesh (1993) examines the Treasury notes and 
bonds auctions and finds only weak support for the theory. Nyborg and Sundaresan (1994) 
compare the profitability and bidding strategies in discriminatory and uniform price auctions. 
Away from the U.S. market, however, there is a significant paucity of literature on this subject, 
with the exception of Umlauf (1993) who examines the Mexican T-bill auctions. Our paper 
makes a contribution to fill this gap. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the institutional 
background and the data. Section 3 examines the bids in JGB auctions and the distribution of 
winning bids across different classes of bidders. Section 4 estimates the auction profits and 
examines the relation between these profits and the winning shares of Japanese and U.S. bidders. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2. Background and Data 
The JGBs are issued by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in discriminatory price auction. 
The 10-year JGB is the largest sector of government bonds, accounting for more than 80% of the 
amount outstanding. The auction schedule for 10-year JGBs is as follows. During the last 10 
days of every month, the Ministry of Finance announces the coupon and the size of the next JGB 
issue, which are set after negotiations with the syndicate members. The issues range from 500 
billion yen to 1 trillion yen in our sample period. The announcement of the actual size and the 
bond coupon occurs at 8:30 am on the auction date and bids are received from 11:30 am to 1:30 
pm. Any syndicate member can bid up to 30% of the amount offered for auction. Although all 
members of the syndicates are eligible to submit bids, typically most of the bids are made by 
large banks and securities houses. The MOF releases the auction results at 4:30 pm (2:30 pm 
after April 1993). On the next day, the remaining underwritten portion is allocated according to 
the preset shares at the quantity-weighted average price of successful bids.6 An underwriting 
6Although the syndicate shares may be revised every year, they are generally fixed and do not 
directly reflect the results of previous auctions. The breakup as of April 1994 is as follows 
(source: Ministry of Finance): 
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commission of 0.63 yen per 100 yen face value is paid from the government for both auctioned 
and non-competitively allocated portions. Since this can be considered as a subsidy from the 
government, in our analysis below, we subtract this amount from the auction prices. 
The actual issue usually occurs on the 20th of the calendar month after the auction and 
the payment is made on the issue date. There is no when-issued market in the pre-auction period 
similar to that in the U.S. and hence it is the bidder's sole responsibility to distribute what they 
win in auctions. Syndicate members can start trading the bonds on a when-issued basis after the 
auction date, although there is no formal market for such transactions. 
The auction mechanism for 20-year JGBs is essentially the same as that for 10-year 
bonds. The main differences are: (1) they are issued much less frequently (2-4 times a year); (2) 
they are sold entirely through auction (no syndicate) since September 1987; and (3) there is no 
underwriting commission paid to the bidders. 
The secondary market trading of JGBs is concentrated on the over-the-counter 
transactions through Nihon Sogo Shoken (Japan Bond Trading Company). Roughly 95% of 
transaction are on the OTC. JGBs are also listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange on the first 
trading day in the second month following the issue date, but the Exchange transactions are 
aimed at small investors. The characteristics of the secondary market are discussed in detail by 
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Campbell and Hamao (1993) and Kikugawa and Singleton (1995). 
We obtained data on auction results since its introduction in April 1989 for 10-year JGBs, 
and since May 1991 for 20-year JGBs. Our sample period ends November 1994. The database 
contains average and minimum winning bids (in prices), coverage ratio (total bids tendered 
divided by amount sold in auction) and quantity of successful bids by each bidder (domestic and 
foreign). These data are collected by Sanyo Securities and are published in Kinyu Facsimile 
Shinbun (Financial Facsimile News), which is a newsletter circulated among dealers. 
We also obtained daily secondary market prices of newly issued bonds, as well as bonds 
with similar maturities from the auction date, from Goldman Sachs. We use the last dealer quote 
of the day in our analysis. 
3. JGB Auctions: Winning Bids 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for 10- and 20-year JGB auctions. The auctions 
are grouped by the relevant Japanese fiscal year which begins in April. Our sample consists of 
68 auctions for 10-year JGBs and 14 auctions for 20-year JGBs. Of the 68 10-year JGB auctions, 
49 are auctions of new bonds while 19 are reopenings. Of the 16 auctions of 20-year JGBs 14 
were new issues and two were reopens. 
A total of 54.4 trillion yen was raised with the issue of 10-year JGBs (both through 
auctions and direct issues to syndicates) during this sample period. The total issue of 20-year 
JGBs was considerably smaller and the total amount raised was 4.5 trillion yen. 
The average coverage ratio in the 10-year JGB auctions is 4.07. The coverage ratio is 
nearly twice that for the 10-year note auctions in the U.S. where it is 2.16 (see Jegadeesh (1993)). 
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The average price range for accepted bids is 0.13%, which is significantly smaller than the 
average range of 0.24% in the U.S. The lower range of accepted bids in Japan suggests that there 
is less price uncertainty in the Japanese market. This is somewhat surprising since there is no 
pre-auction when-issued market in Japan. Unlike in the U.S. market, the participants in the JGB 
auctions do not have the benefit of price discovery provided by the when-issued market. It 
appears, however, that any increased price uncertainty due to the absence of when-issued market 
was more than offset by lower interest rate uncertainty in Japan and higher level of auction 
participation, as indicated by the higher coverage ratio, resulting in lower dispersion of accepted 
bids. 
Table 2 presents the average winning bids tendered by the major participants in the 
auctions. In the 10-year JGB auctions, Japanese commercial banks tendered 29.67% of the 
winning bids in 1989. Their share declined to 15.16%) in 1991 and eventually recovered to 
24.86% in 1994. The U.S. firms started off strong winning 25.88% of the auction in 1989 but 
their share declined rapidly to 4.41% in 1992 before recovering to 13.85% in 1994. Much of the 
loss of the U.S. share is due to the diminished role played by Salomon Brothers in the post-1991 
period. This was the time that Salomon Brothers was embroiled in the Treasury Auction scandal 
in the U.S. (see Jegadeesh (1993)). The decline in the U.S. share may be related to this scandal 
and the eventual departure of key personnel in the Government Bond desk in New York. 
A bulk of the loss in share of Japanese banks and U.S. firms was captured by the big four 
Japanese investment banks (Daiwa, Nikko, Nomura and Yamaichi). Their share grew from 
33.50% in 1989 to 73.33% in 1992 before declining to 46.64% in 1994. Foreign firms other than 
U.S. firms failed to make any significant inroads into the JGB auction market and their combined 
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share hovered around one percent over the entire sample period. 
It is interesting to compare the percentage winnings in auctions with syndicate 
allocations. As stated earlier, only 60% of the 10-year JGB issues (40% until September 1990) 
are sold through auction while the remaining 40% are allocated to a syndicate at the quantity-
weighted auction price. The MOF decides on the share of each firm in the syndicate. The 
combined share of Japanese banks in the syndicate is 65% (see footnote 6) while they win on 
average only 21% of the auctioned portion of the issues. On the other hand, the combined share 
of foreign firms in the syndicate is only 8% while they win about 15% of the auctions. It appears 
that the syndicate system in the 10-year JGB issues serves to protect a certain share for Japanese 
banks that are probably not equipped to compete in the auctions, at the expense of foreign 
competition. 
Table 2 (Panel B) presents the shares of the major participants in the 20-year JGB 
auctions. In these auctions the share of Japanese commercial and investment banks declined over 
time. In 1991, the Japanese commercial and investment banks won 25.84%) and 68.24% 
respectively but their shares declined to 13.96% and 5432% by 1994. Meanwhile, the share of 
the U.S. investment banks increased from a mere 5.70% in 1991 to 27.09%o in 1994. A large part 
of the gain in the U.S. share came from the increased share of Goldman Sachs. Here again, 
foreign firms other than U.S. firms failed to make a significant entry.7 
7It should be noted that Japanese commercial banks participate in the auction mainly as 
ultimate investors, not as dealers. Banks owned 36%) of JGBs outstanding as their investment in 
1992 (Bond Underwriters Association of Japan, 1994). Banks are also allowed to sell 
government bonds to their clients since 1985, but these transactions tend to be retail-oriented and 
small in volume. 
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It appears that the effort of the U.S. government to open the Japanese market paid off at 
least in the short run in terms of enabling the U.S. firms to gain a significant share of the market. 
The U.S. firms will be able to retain this share and grow over time if they possess superior 
bidding skills. Many market participants in Japan, however, argue that the early U.S. gains in the 
auction are due to their aggressive bidding because of an eagerness to establish a presence in the 
market even at a loss in the auction. In this case, the U.S. market share in the auction may not be 
sustainable. 
4. A Test of Auction Theory 
This section tests the predictions of auction theory with JGB auction data. We also 
examine whether U.S. securities houses exhibit differential bidding skills relative to their 
Japanese counterparts. 
The specifics of the discriminatory price auction designed for JGB auctions has a number 
of complex features that are difficult to entirely incorporate into an analytically tractable model. 
Our tests, therefore, rely on the predictions of first-price auctions where each bidder submits one 
bid for one unit of the auctioned good.8 The predictions of these models which do not 
specifically depend on auction design are tested here. The models that form the basis of our tests 
are Milgrom and Weber (1982), Englebrecht-Wiggins et al. (1983) and French and McCormick 
(1984). 
8In first-price auctions, the highest bidder gets the auctioned good at the price that he or she 
bids. In a second-price auction the highest bidder gets the auctioned good at the highest losing 
price. 
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In these auction models, each bidder first forms an expectation of the value of the 
auctioned good conditional on his or her information and conditional on winning the auction. 
The expected value of the good conditional on winning the auction is less than the expected 
value without this conditioning due to the "winner's curse." Adjusting for winner's curse 
provides an unbiased estimate of the value of the good. If one were to subsequently bid this 
amount and win, the expected profit would be zero. 
When there are a finite number of bidders, each bidder bids below the winner's curse-
adjusted expected value of the good. The difference between the conditional expected value and 
the bid is the expected profit for the winner in the auction. Two factors that affect the expected 
profit to the winner are the extent of dispersion of opinion among bidders and the number of 
bidders. The marginal probability of losing an auction by lowering the bid by a given amount 
decreases with an increase in the dispersion of bidders' pre-auction valuations. Therefore, 
auction theory predicts that higher dispersion of opinion on average results in lower bids and 
higher auction profits. The marginal probability of losing an auction by lowering the bid by a 
given amount increases with increasing levels of competition. Therefore, increased competition 
on average results in higher bids and lower profits. It should be noted that both these predictions 
obtain when there is a finite number of bidders. When the number of bidders is large 
(technically, tending to infinity) then the auction is characterized by perfect competition and the 
expected auction profit is zero. All bidders bid their winner's curse-adjusted conditionally 
expected values. 
To examine whether the Japanese or U.S. investment banks systematically exhibit 
superior bidding skills we use the predictions of Englebrecht-Wiggins, Milgrom and Weber 
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(1983). Englebrecht-Wiggins et al. consider an auction for a common value good in a setting 
where one bidder is informed and the other is uninformed. In their model, the expected profit 
conditional on the informed bidder winning the auction is higher than the expected profit 
conditional on the uninformed bidder winning the auction. 
We estimate the auction profits using two approaches. In the first approach the auction 
profit is measured simply as the percentage return for buying the bond at the auction at the 
average auction price and holding it until date t. The first measure of auction profit, say 6 is: 
where APta is the percentage change in price between the auction and date t. Since trading in the 
auction bonds is on a forward basis until the issue date, no adjustments are required for carrying 
cost or accrued coupons. 
This measure of ex-post profit contains the expected auction profit component as well as 
any price change due to unexpected changes in interest rates. Price changes due to interest rate 
changes add noise to the profit estimates. We therefore compute a second profit measure which 
controls for price changes due to interest rate changes. The second measure, say 62^ is: 
where APtc is the average percentage change in price of three control bonds from the auction 
date to date t. The control bonds are bonds with maturities closest to the auction bonds.9 This 
9Our results were qualitatively similar when we used one control bond rather than three bonds. 
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measure uses the average control bond price change to filter out the effect of price changes due to 
interest rate changes. Since the control bonds are traded in the spot market, we adjust their 
returns for accrued coupon and carrying cost. 
Table 3 presents both measures of auction profits for t = 1 to 5. We restrict the sample to 
new issues only and exclude reopenings.10 For 10-year JGBs, both measures of auction profit are 
typically negative on average and close to one another but they are not reliably different from 
zero. In comparison, Jegadeesh (1993) finds that for 10-year Treasury notes in the U.S., the 
average auction profit is 12 basis points, which is reliably positive. Nyborg and Sundaresan 
(1994), using transactions data, also find statistically significant positive profits. The lower 
expected auction profits in Japan are perhaps due to a combination of more intense competition 
in the auctions, as reflected in higher coverage ratios, and lower price uncertainty as reflected in 
the narrower price range. 
Although both profit measures of profits are quite close for the entire sample period, in 
certain auctions these measures were of opposite signs. For instance, 6t t is on average negative 
in 1989 while 821 is positive. This is due to the fact that the interest rates rose in the period after 
the auction date but the effect of interest rate change was effectively removed when we measure 
the profits relative to the price changes of control bonds. Because of this, 621 exhibits lower 
volatility than 6ir For instance, the variance of 821 is 80% of that of 6X and the variance of 
82 5 is 15% of that of 815 . Since 821 is more precisely measured, we use this measure of auction 
10We examined reopened issues separately. Since the prices of reopened bonds after the 
auction date are the same as the existing identical bonds, we measure the auction profits by 
comparing the average auction price and the price on the day after the auction. The resulting 
auction profits are also not significantly different from zero. 
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profit in further analysis.11 
Table 3, Panel B presents the profits for 20-year JGB auctions. The average profit in this 
auction is also not reliably different from zero, as in the case of 10-year bonds. Here again 62 
exhibits lower variance than 6ir 
There has been a public policy debate on the design of Treasury auctions. Several 
authors have argued that uniform price auctions would result in higher revenues for the seller 
than discriminatory price auctions.12 Nyborg and Sundaresan (1994) find that consistent with 
this view, auction profits for uniform price auctions in the U.S. Treasury market are lower. In the 
Japanese context, however, there is unlikely to be a room for further improvement (from the 
government's point of view) by introducing uniform price auctions, since the current system of 
discriminatory price auction creates no economically significant auction profits. 
In our tests of the auction theory, we use the coverage ratio (Ratio) as the measure of 
competition. High coverage ratio indicates intense competition and hence is expected to be 
associated with low auction profit. We use the difference between the average auction price and 
the lowest accepted bid (Range) as a measure of dispersion of pre-auction valuation. 
As mentioned earlier, sales of JGB s through auctions was a result of negotiations between 
the U.S. and Japanese governments. The introduction of auction marked the point where foreign 
11
 Since the period between the auction and the issue date (typically 15 business days) does not 
have an organized market, one might consider trading during this period may not be active, 
making measures of auction profits less meaningful. Although we do not have the data on 
volume during this period and the period after the issue date, we examined auction profits for 30 
days after auction. The results reported for five days are qualitatively the same for the longer 
period. 
12See Goldstein (1962)'s quotation of Milton Friedman, and Milgrom and Weber (1982). 
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securities firms were able to freely compete with their Japanese counterparts for the first time in 
the primary market of the JGB. Therefore it is interesting to investigate into the performance of 
these two competing sectors. To examine the relative skills of the U.S. and Japanese securities 
houses, we examine whether auction profits are related to the share of auction won by each group 
after controlling for the effects of Ratio and Range, Our focus here is to compare behaviors of 
directly competitive players in the JGB market, the four largest Japanese and U.S. investment 
banks. We do not consider commercial banks since they are not directly competing with 
investment banks in the secondary market (see footnote 7).13 
The variables Big4Japan and Big4US used in the regression below are the fractions of the 
auction won by the four major Japanese investment banks (Daiwa, Nikko, Nomura, and 
Yamaichi) and four major U.S. investment banks (Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan 
Stanley, and Salomon Brothers), respectively. If the Japanese firms have superior information, 
then the profits would on average be large in auctions where they win a large fraction than in the 
auctions where they win a small fraction. 
We control for the competitiveness and uncertainty in auction and fit the following two 
regressions for our tests: 
13
 After excluding commercial banks and other Japanese securities houses, the shares of the 
largest four Japanese and U.S. investment banks are not perfectly negatively correlated. 
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Table 4 presents the regression estimates. The slope coefficients on both the Ratio and 
Range are not reliably different from zero. This suggests that the level of competition or the 
level of uncertainty do not play a significant role in determining auction profits. This is true for 
both 10- and 20-year JGB auctions (Panels A and B respectively). This result is consistent with 
our finding that the average auction profit is zero. It appears that the number of bidders is 
sufficiently large so that the expected auction profit is driven down to zero. In this case, since 
the theory predicts that ex-ante expected profit is zero there will be no relation between ex-post 
profits and the variables Range and Ratio. 
Turning to the slope coefficients on the country variables for the 10-year JGB auction, we 
find that the slope coefficient of Big4Japan is reliably negative. On the other hand, the slope 
coefficient on the variable Big4US is reliably positive. This indicates that the larger winnings of 
the Japanese firms in the auction are related to lower profits and the larger winnings of the U.S. 
firms are related to higher profits. For the 20-year JGB auctions the slope coefficient of 
Big4Japan is significantly negative. The slope coefficient of Big4US is on average positive but 
not reliably different from zero. The lack of significance of this slope coefficient is likely due to 
the limited sample size and the resulting lack of precision with which the parameters are 
estimated. Nevertheless, the general result suggests that the U.S. firms have bidding skills 
superior to those of their Japanese counterparts. 
To further analyze this point, we sort auctions into three groups by the percentage won by 
the Big 4 Japanese and U.S. firms, respectively. These results provide a more direct picture of 
the linkage between the auction profits and the winning share of the Japanese and the U.S. firms. 
Table 5 presents the average profits from one to five days after the auctions. For the 10-year 
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JGB, when the Japanese Big 4 firms win a low proportion of the auction, the auction profits are 
positive (although not statistically significantly so). But when they win a high proportion of the 
auction, the profits are significantly negative and increasing over time. On the contrary, for the 
U.S. Big 4 firms, the profits are significantly negative when they win a low percentage of the 
auctioned bond. A similar pattern is observed in the 20-year JGB auctions. While significantly 
negative auction profits are associated with the high winning proportions by the Japanese Big 4 
firms, positive profits are seen when U.S. Big 4 firms win high proportions. 
One interpretation for this pattern is that the U.S. firms have the advantage in processing 
the information concerning the value of the JGBs sold in the auctions. They win relatively more 
in auctions when the expected profits are high. The Japanese investment banks seem to be 
willing to bid even when the bonds they get in auctions are expected to generate losses. 
Another interpretation of our evidence is also possible. The Japanese Big 4 firms may 
have private value associated with bidding in the auctions that is not readily evident when we 
consider only the profits in the auction. For example, the Japanese Big 4 firms may be in a better 
position to sell the JGBs to investors through their institutional distribution network, especially 
to regional, relation-oriented clients. There have been several accounts in the press suggesting 
this point. For example, the trade publication Nikkei Newsletter on Bond and Money reports that 
"... aggressive bidding prices by Japanese houses are only justifiable by their ability to sell JGBs 
to their clients in combination with other attractive products such as new issues of convertible 
bonds that they underwrite (April 17, 1989)." Other anecdotal evidence suggests that some 
Japanese investment banks often receive orders for large bids from Japanese institutional 
investors who wish to be anonymous at the time of auctions. These are called "proxy bids (Dairi 
16 
Nyusatsu)" and are submitted by investment banks at the prices and quantities the clients specify. 
If the price risk of the auction bonds in the primary market is borne by clients (as indicated in 
these anecdotal stories) and if the market impact of purchasing the newly issued bonds in the 
secondary market is large, this "distribution advantage" would play a major role in the sales of 
JGBs, and hence influence the bidding strategy. In this case, for the major Japanese investment 
banks, their private valuation is not captured when we look only at auction profits. This would 
imply that it is not appropriate to characterize the JGB auction as common value good auction. 
We can further speculate another possible explanation. It is well known that the financial 
system in Japan is rather tightly regulated. Regulation of financial markets by the government 
also implies protection of (domestic) financial institutions by the government. In the post-war 
period, there has been no bankruptcy of Japanese securities houses despite occasional financial 
distresses for these firms. For example, a financial crisis of Yamaichi Securities in the 1960s was 
avoided by a low-interest rate loan made by the Bank of Japan. After the loss-compensation 
scandal by Japanese securities firms in 1991, some suggested deregulating the current fixed 
commission system on equity transactions. This was met by strong opposition from the 
securities firms as well as the government who were concerned about the adverse effect on 
revenues for the securities industry. Under these circumstances of "give and take" between the 
financial industry and the government, it is conceivable that domestic investment banks are 
obliged to purchase government bonds even at unfavorable prices in order to maintain a good 
long-term relationship with the government. Although the introduction of the auction system in 
the JGB market is one step toward deregulation, the performance of Japanese and U.S. 
investment banks as shown in our paper seem to indicate that the competition on a level playing 
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field is yet to be achieved. 
5. Conclusions 
Japan introduced an auction mechanism to sell government bonds after lengthy 
negotiations with the U.S. and the U.K. This paper examines the performance of the U.S. firms 
in the 10- and 20-year JGB auction market. We find that the U.S. firms quickly gained a 
significant share of this market. While the U.S. share in the 10-year JGB auctions went through 
ups and downs, the U.S. share has steadily increased over time in the 20-year JGB market. We 
examined the relation between auction profits and winning shares by the "Big 4" Japanese and 
U.S. investment banks. We find that the U.S. firms are more "profit sensitive" than their 
Japanese counterparts. We present some possible explanations for this finding. 
This paper also tested the predictions of auction theory with JGB auction data. We find 
that the average auction profit is not reliably different from zero. We also do not find any 
association between auction profits and measures of competition and dispersion of opinion 
among bidders, as predicted by the theory. Our results indicate that the JGB auctions are better 
characterized by auctions with an infinite number of bidders where perfect competition (resulting 
in zero expected profits) is achieved, than by an auction with a finite number of bidders where 
each informed bidder expects to make non-zero profits. 
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Table 1. 
Japanese Government Bond Auctions - Ten- and Twenty-Year Bond 
Issues. 
This table presents the summary information of Japanese Government Bond 
(JGB) auctions for ten- and twenty-year bond issues. The sample period for the 
ten-year bond auctions is April 1989 to November 1994. From April 1989 to Septem-
ber 1990, 40% of each ten-year JGB issue was sold in the auction and the rest were 
allocated to syndicate members at the average auction price and from October 1990 
60% of each JGB issue was sold in the auction. The sample period for the twenty-year 
JGB auctions is May 1991 to November 1994. All twenty-year JGB issues were sold 
in the auction. 
Price Range is the difference between the weighted average auction price and the 
lowest accepted bid in the auction. Coverage ratio is the ratio of total bids in an 




Japanese Government Bond Auctions - Distribution of Winning Bids. 
This table presents the percentage of ten- and twenty-year Japanese Government 




Profits to winning bids in Japanese Government Bond Auctions - Ten-
and Twenty-Year Bonds. 
This table presents the average profits to winning bids in the ten- and twenty-
year JGB auctions. Two measures of auction profits are reported here. AP ta is the 
percentage change in price of the auction bond (expressed in basis points) from the 
value-weighted average auction price to the secondary market price at the close of 
t days after the auction. APf is the average percentage change in the secondary 
market price of three seasoned bonds with maturity closest to the auction bond. The 
secondary market price changes of seasoned bonds account for changes in accrued 






Association of Japanese Government Bond Auction Profits with Price 
Range, Coverage ratio and Winning Shares of Japanese and U.S. 
Investment Banks: Regression Analysis 
This table reports the parameter estimates of the following regression: 
where auction profit is defined as APf—APtc; APf is the percentage change in price of 
the auction bond (expressed in basis points) from the value-weighted average auction 
price to the secondary market price at the close of t days after the auction. AP£ is 
the average percentage change in the secondary market price of three seasoned bonds 
with the maturity closest to the auction bond. See Table 1 for definition of "Ratio" 
and "Range." "Big-4 Japan" is the fraction of the auction won by the following four 
Japanese investment banks: Daiwa, Nikko, Nomura and Yamaichi; "Big-4 U.S" is the 
fraction of the auction won by the following four U.S. investment banks: Goldman 






Auction Profits and Winning Shares of Japanese and U.S. Investment 
Banks in Japanese Government Bond Auctions. 
This table presents the average profits in ten- and twenty-year JGB auction within 
three groups sorted based on the percentage of auction won by Big-4 Japan and also 
within three groups sorted based on the percentage of auction won by Big-4 US. t 
statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Panel A. Ten-year JGB 
30 
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